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Abstract—Due to the applicability of a wide range of cryptosystems in recently proposed applications, large variety of cryptographic 
schemes have been developed. It can be claimed that proposing a cryptographic protocol to satisfy security and efficiency requirements is 
one of the significant challenging issues. Nevertheless, cryptographic research community suffers from non-existence of an integrated 
pattern to categorize and standardize possible challenges of mentioned concerns. These drawbacks could in turn lead to much confusion 
for the researchers who are not expert in this research area. Therefore, we paid particular attention to assemble a powerful document to 
fill this gap between the beginners and the experts. Our final goal is to make other researchers able to classify the challenges over Provably 
Secure cryptosystems or lightweight ones, analyze the proposed scheme based on the determined components and help them to find better 
solutions for the future researches. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The widely usage of collaborative and distributed applications in the resource constrained devices, recently led to developing a 
large variety of lightweight security mechanisms in such environments. Moreover, the natural vulnerability of such communicating 
links made the security field one of the most interesting challenges especially in resource constraints platforms. In this way, many 
researchers have been tried to propose appropriate solutions to make such environments more reliable than ever before. From the 
security viewpoint, a subset of mentioned solutions have been tried to prevent the considered environment from some categories of 
external attacks [1-3], while some others tried to detect possible threats and proposed some solutions to resist against [4-6]. If roughly 
speaking, it is possible to claim that the level of proposed secure protocols can be emphasizing on cryptographic protocols or as a 
higher level they can use other cryptographic functions as a building block to make the considered protocol. 
From the security perspective, the objective of this research is to focus on those categories of cryptosystems, which are 
provably secure. Being provably secure emphasizes on this fact that breaking the considered scheme would lead to solve one of the 
mathematical hard problems. Beside of what mentioned above, it is necessary to point out that the limitations of resources such as 
memory usage, computation capacity, energy consuming, etc., made the majority of the proposed schemes inappropriate for resource- 
constrained devices. The importance of efficiency in mentioned cryptographic schemes motivated us to pay particular attention to 
the efficiency of cryptosystems beside of the security scientific area. 
The final goal of this research is based on three dimensions. As the first dimension, we have tried to trace the way that a subset 
of researchers made their proposed cryptosystems lightweight. The outline of this part is to clarify what investigated in [7]. As the 
second dimension, we have tried to introduce the boundary of well-known standard attacks against the main cryptographic 
primitives, Encryption, Digital Signature and key Agreement. Finally, the last dimension introduces possible challenges for the 
future researches over cryptosystems especially lightweight and/or provably secure ones by expanding what investigated in [7] to 
cover more variety of cryptographic protocols. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second section is related to tracing a sequence of researches to make 
cryptosystems lightweight for resource-constrained platforms. The third section provides an extensive presentation of the standard 
attacks for three main cryptographic primitives, Encryption, Digital Signature and Key Agreement. Then, in the fourth section, we 
outlined the possible challenges of lightweight and/or provably secure cryptosystems to cover a wide range of possible open 
problems in these scientific areas. Finally, the last section concludes the contents of this document. 
 
II. A PROGRESSIVE HISTORY OF MAKING CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEMES LIGHTWEIGHT 
As it is pointed out before, the limitations of resources is one of the most significant challenging issues in the variety of proposed 
cryptographic schemes. To solve this problem many proposed schemes have tried to use symmetric cryptosystems such as RC5 [8] 
and Skip-Jack [9] to make the proposed scheme lightweight. Although symmetric cryptographic schemes were more efficient than 
public-key ones, they suffer from a subset of significant problems especially from key management perspective. In contrast with 
symmetric cryptosystems, the use of public-key cryptographic schemes could make key management security services easier and 
reduces the overhead of transmitting processes [10,11]. 
Mentioned reasons above were sufficient to persuade a large group of developers to find a solution to make public key 
cryptosystems feasible in resource-constrained platforms [7]. To make the use of public key cryptosystems feasible in such resource 
constrained environments, it is possible to refer to what Gaubatz et al. proposed in [10]. In this document, the authors could reduce 
the traffic overhead by simplifying the implementation of a public-key cryptographic scheme, therefore reducing the amount of  
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transmission power. Beside of this, Baek et al. could propose a lightweight public-key encryption scheme from computation time and 
communication overhead viewpoints [12]. 
Motivated by what pointed above, cryptography research community have concluded that the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) is the golden key to make public key cryptosystems lightweight in order to make them appropriate for resource constrained 
platforms [7]. As an example, we can refer to the result of what studied by Tan et al. [13] who compared the energy cost of two 
popular Public-Key cryptosystems, RSA and ECC. The last result of this study indicated that the use of ECC instead of RSA based 
cryptosystems leads to obtaining smaller key size, decreasing the expense of computation power and communication capacity and 
reduces the amount of transmitted or stored data. The TABLE I and TABLE II demonstrate the used key sizes for ECC based 
cryptosystems and RSA based ones as a function of considered security levels based on two standard documents, NIST [14] and 
ECRYPT [15], respectively. 
 
TABLE I. KEY SIZES OF NIST STANDARD DOCUMENT [14] 
 
Security level (bits) 
 
 
 
Category of cryptosystems 
 
80 
 
128 
 
256 
ECC-based 160 256 512 
Finite field 1024 3072 15360 
 
 
TABLE II.  KEY SIZES OF ECRYPT STANDARD DOCUMENT [15] 
 
Security level (bits) 
 
 
 
Category of cryptosystems 
 
80 
 
128 
 
256 
ECC-based 160 256 512 
Finite field 1248 3248 15424 
 
It is worth noting that the “Security Level” parameter in the TABLE I and TABLE II refers to the size of required cryptographic 
field to attain a given level of security against the Discrete Logarithm mathematical hard problem. The outcome of mentioned results 
above, emphasizes on the fact that the use of ECC based cryptosystems leads to implementing more efficient public-key 
cryptographic schemes. Accordingly, a large variety of lightweight    ECC based cryptosystems have been proposed to fulfill the 
requirements of a subset of resource constrained environments. The use of bilinear pairings over algebraic elliptic curves is the basis 
of a large category of mentioned ECC based cryptosystems [7]. Therefore, pairing based cryptography has had a significant role in 
the most proposed lightweight cryptosystems especially in resource-constrained ones [16]. Generally, bilinear pairings are one of the 
significant categories of algebraic maps, which most of them are constructed based on Miller algorithm [17]. Since, the use of these 
maps is the basis of many recently proposed lightweight cryptosystems, various researches have been done to make bilinear pairings 
more efficient in order to make them perfect for lightweight pairing based cryptographic schemes in resource-constrained platforms 
[7]. 
It is necessary to point out to deploy public key cryptosystems by the use of bilinear pairings, existing entities must be able to 
validate the public-key of the other side authorized ones. Although this concern can be settled by the use of Public Key Infrastructures 
(PKI), the high expense of PKI seems to make this method impractical in resource- constrained environments. To eliminate this 
drawback, identity based cryptosystems came into the mentioned scientific area. The idea of identity based cryptosystems in the 
context of public key ones was first suggested by Adi Shamir [18], in order to use the user’s identifier instead of their public 
key, therefore eliminating the need to digital certificates. Then, implementing this idea remained an open problem for seventeen 
years, until Boneh et al. could propose the first applicable Provably-Secure identity based cryptosystem under the Bilinear Diffie 
Hellman (BDH) assumption [19]. The next section provides an overview for the boundary of standard attacks against the provably 
secure main cryptographic primitives, which most of them are defined in the context of identity-based cryptosystems. 
 
III. BOUNDARY OF ATTACKS IN MAIN PRIMITIVES 
This section assigns to a review over the boundary of attacks in Provably Secure schemes for three main primitives, 
Encryption, Digital Signature, and Key Agreement. The considered model for the determined attacker is an essential component in 
Provable Security evaluation method. To prove the security of an evaluated scheme, this model, named Attack Model, aimed to 
identify the boundaries of possible attacks that the evaluated scheme must be secure against. Hence, based on the considered 
primitive (e.g. Encryption, Digital Signature, Key Agreement, etc.) this model should be defined. More precisely, the model of 
queries that an imaginary adversary can issue within a polynomial time complexity before attempting to break the scheme, shapes 
the model of mentioned boundary of possible attacks. Clearly, considering the ability of issuing wide and various queries for the 
imaginary adversary brings a much more powerful model than a limited one. 
Another essential component of Provable Security evaluation method is the Attacker Goal. In fact, the Attacker Goal determines 
the form of the challenge between the security evaluator and the determined imaginary adversary. It is necessary to  
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point out that this goal is a probability distribution and could be “computational” or “decisional”. It is noteworthy that easier goal 
from the adversary entity’s viewpoint can make the Attacker Goal stronger. 
The Attack Models for fundamental cryptographic primitives “Encryption,” “Digital signature,” and “Key Agreement” are 
discussed in the next subsections. 
 
A. Attack Model of Encryption schemes 
There are two main classes of Attack Models for Encryption schemes named Chosen Plaintext Attack(CPA) and Chosen 
Ciphertext Attack(CCA) that have been introduced by Bellare et al. in [19]. In the first class, the adversary might be challenged 
through one of the encryptions of the plaintexts of her choice while in the second one the decryption oracle is also accessible. Beside 
of these two classes, it is possible to define adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack which is more powerful than normal CCA. In this 
kind of attack model, the decryption oracle is accessible for the adversary even after obtaining the challenge ciphertext [19]. 
Moreover, two Attacker Goals have been considered for Encryption schemes by the same authors named Indistinguishability 
(IND) and Non-Malleability (NM). In the first one, the considered adversary cannot obtain any knowledge about plaintext relevant 
to the challenging ciphertext. In Non-Malleability, the adversary who obtained two plaintexts P1 and P2 (meaningfully related) and 
the ciphertext C1 (the ciphertext of P1) is incapable to produce C2 (the ciphertext of P2). 
Similar to this subsection, following subsection focuses on the boundary of adversary in another important security primitive 
which is Digital Signature. 
 
B. Attack Model of Digital Signature schemes 
Attack Model for Digital Signature can be categorized in two main groups called “key-only attacks” and “message attacks” based 
on the discussions in [20]. The first one covers those attacks that adversary assumed to have just the signer’s public-key whereas in 
the other one, the corresponding signature for a group of known or chosen messages can be taken from an oracle which is accessible 
by the adversary. Hence, the message attacks are more powerful than the key-only attacks. 
In general, message attacks can be categorized into three groups [20]: 
a. Known-Message Attack (KMA).  Valid signatures of a set of messages are given to the adversary by the oracle. The 
adversary has knowledge about the messages but they are not selected based on the adversary’s interest. 
b. Chosen-Message Attack (CMA). The adversary can obtain valid signatures of a set of messages selectively but before the 
challenge phase. 
c. Adaptive Chosen-Message Attack (ACMA). The adversary is able to communicate with the oracle as a signer and request 
signatures for desired messages adaptively even after the challenge phase. 
 
Attacker Goal for an attacker against Digital Signature schemes can be defined in three main classes [20]: 
d. Total Break. The adversary aimed to compute the signer’s private-key or to find an efficient algorithm to forge all valid 
signatures. 
e. Selective Forgery. The adversary must be able to generate valid signatures for a set of chosen messages. 
f. Existential Forgery. The adversary must be able to forge a signature for at least one of the messages. 
 
It is noteworthy that, although the last goal is the easiest goal for the adversary, it brings stronger model for defense than two others. 
C. Attack Model of Key Agreement schemes 
In continue to what pointed out before, the Attack Model of a Key Agreement protocol can be considered from two dimensions. 
Based on this, the only well-defined model for the notion of security in Key Agreement protocols is based on Bellare and 
Rogaway Model (BRM) [21]. In this Attack Model, the adversary can access the oracle from the first party’s viewpoint to issue 
three followed queries: 
: This query lets the considered adversary to send her chosen message as a “material exchange” sub-phase 
message to the entity in   the 
session “s” of the protocol. 
 This query lets the adversary to obtain the shared key that can be established between and 
in the session “s” of the protocol. 
In this query the adversary can issue the first party’s long-term private key. 
It is worth mentioning that an oracle at any time can be in one of the following possible states: 
Accepted: in this case, the adversary issues allowed queries. 
Rejected: in this condition, the adversary issues not- allowed queries. 
Opened: an oracle is opened if the adversary has answered it in one of the reveal queries. 
 
Like the notion of security in other primitives, the adversary at some time decides to be challenged. At this time, the adversary 
asks a Test query on a Fresh oracle. 
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An accepted oracle such as      named Fresh if the adversary did not issue the Reveal (       query, the query Corrupt (i) have not 
been asked by the adversary, and the oracle      is not opened. However if the adversary asked a Test (     ) query in the challenge 
phase, the oracle randomly chooses                    .  if b=0 the oracle gives the  adversary the corresponding session key, but otherwise 
it gives her a random sample instead. Finally, the adversary outputs her guess      for b. 
Based on what pointed out before, the model of adversary’s guess is decisional. So, the function of guess probability distribution 
for an adversary such as “A” against the key agreement scheme “KA” can be obtained from following equation: 
       (1) 
In continue to what mentioned before, the TABLE III, introduces six provably secure cryptographic schemes of three main 
primitives. 
 
TABLE III. CONSIDERED ATTACK MODEL FOR A SUBSET OF PROPOSED SCHEMES 
 
Category of 
protocol 
Author(s) Attack Model 
Model Goal 
Encryption Boneh, Franklin [23] CPA IND 
Encryption Boneh, Boyen [24] CCA IND 
Digital Signature Boneh et al. [25] CMA SF 
Digital Signature Boldyreva [26] CMA EF 
Key Agreement Wang [27] BRM BRM 
Key Agreement Chen, Kudla [28] BRM BRM 
 
It is worth to note that although it is possible to compare two provably secure schemes from the reduced mathematical hard problem 
[22], this paper excludes this scientific topic. The next section issues possible challenges of lightweight and/or provably secure 
cryptographic protocols. 
 
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES AROUND LIGHTWEIGHT AND/OR PROVABLY SECURE CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
In continue to what investigated in the previous sections, this section assigns to a subset of possible issues and challenges, which 
can be considered as future researches in the area of lightweight and provably secure schemes over the use of bilinear pairings in 
the context of identity based cryptosystems. Some findings of this research, are as follows: 
 
1) Proving the security of a novel proposed cryptographic scheme 
The main significance of a novel research in this category is to prove that the proposed scheme is more reliable than other existing 
ones. This group of developers would be able to reach this goal by doing a combination of followed methods: 
a) To reduce the security of the proposed scheme to a new mathematical hard problem. It is necessary to point out that in this case, 
the developer must claim and prove that the determined mathematical hard problem is more powerful than other reduced ones in 
the considered comparable provably secure scheme 
b) To consider stronger notion of security by assuming a stronger Attack Model or stronger Attacker Goal based on what mentioned 
in the third section. 
 
2) Improving an existing cryptographic scheme from efficiency or performance viewpoint 
The main focus of this group of researches is to focus on a considered cryptosystem or a subset of them,  instead of proposing a 
novel one. This group of developers are able to improve a determined scheme by doing a combination of followed ways: 
a) To decrease the expense of the determined scheme by considering some criterions such as computational cost, 
communicational capacity, memory or energy usage, etc. 
b) To improve the functionality of a considered secure protocol by eliminating the number of involving entities such as Trusted 
Third Party 
c) To transform one of the provably secure cryptographic scheme to the another one to obtain the advantages of the first 
primitive 
 
3) Comparing various cryptographic schemes to analyze their functionality 
One of the possible challenges in the area of provably secure cryptosystems is to compare the efficiency or performance of 
a group of schemes from security or expense viewpoints, based on what mentioned in the last item. This comparison would be 
beneficial due to make future researchers able to categorize the existing schemes based on new benchmarks. In addition, this 
comparison would be a useful way to find out the advantages of the proposed schemes in the mentioned scientific area. 
4) Attacking on a known cryptographic scheme or a subclass of them 
The other possible challenge in the area of provably secure cryptosystems is to find a subset of vulnerabilities of a subset of 
schemes to prove that they are not resistant enough against the claimed attacks. 
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5) Finding appropriate applications for a  determined cryptographic scheme 
In addition to the mentioned challenges above, it is possible to use a considered cryptographic scheme as a building block of 
another protocol or application. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to the importance of reliability and efficiency of the existing cryptographic schemes, many researchers have tried to 
propose provably secure and/or lightweight cryptographic schemes. In order to contribute further researches in these fields, 
this paper issues possible challenges beside of required backgrounds of these two scientific areas. 
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